We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of divisible homogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the following properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions, i.e. for each preference profile the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed strategies are used.
Introduction
Consider a set of individuals who have to divide a bundle of homogeneous divisible goods among themselves. A referee, ignorant of the preferences of the individuals, wants the players to end up in a fair division, defined as a division which is both envy-free (EF ) and Pareto optimal (P O). Envy-freeness requires that nobody prefers somebody else's share to her own. Pareto optimality excludes divisions like "everybody gets nothing", which are trivially envy-free but certainly unappealing. Although alternative definitions of fairness are possible, envy-freeness and efficiency have played a prominent role in the fair division literature. The appeal of these properties is probably due to the fact that, beside being intuitive, they refer to ordinal preferences and they do not involve interpersonal utility comparisons.
Our fair division problem can be approached in different ways; to begin with, it can be seen as a theoretical implementation problem. One can prove that under the usual assumptions on preferences (strict monotonicity, continuity, convexity), the fair division correspondence is non-empty and satisfies monotonicity and (vacously) no-veto power. As a consequence, our correspondence is for example implemented by Maskin's (1977 Maskin's ( , 2002 classic game form, when there are at least 3 players. As widely recognized however, this literature aims at probing the theoretical bounds of implementation. Indeed, most mechanisms in this pure implementation literature are aimed at proving the implementability of classes of rules, rather than at providing a workable solution to applied problems. As a consequence these mechanisms usually suffer from two practical problems: first, it is unlikely that real persons can manage their large strategy spaces. Second, most of the existing mechanisms are essentially coordination games with multiple equilibria; it is not clear how players can coordinate on any one of them. We return on this point later on.
Beside the implementation literature there exists another line of research, which follows a "procedural approach" to the fair division problem. Instead of formally defining game forms and adopting precise equilibrium concepts, these contributions give "protocols", mean to lead real claimants to a division.
Results along this line range from evolutions of a divide-and-choose procedure by Banach and Knaster, to methods of sequential allocation. For an authoritative overview see Brams and Taylor (1996) . These mechanisms are meant to be as simple as possible in order to serve concrete cases of division. Most of them could be formalized as game forms, but their equilibria are not often investigated. Instead, players are assumed to use safety strategies. There are of course some reasons for this: a) in many cases, manipulation of the mechanisms would be difficult, b) the Nash equilibria are so difficult to calculate that they don't seem a good predictor of play, c) the important properties of safety (minmax) strategies make them an appealing solution concept. To sum up, on one hand this literature yields mechanisms that are reasonably manipulation-proof, workable and elegant. On the other, it lacks a full gametheoretic formalization. More importantly, there is no known procedure in this literature to yield divisions which are at the same time P O and EF . 1 Ideally located between the implementation literature and the procedural approach, there is the "Divide and Permute" mechanism (Thomson (2005) ). This is a formally defined game form, which implements fair divisions in pure Nash equilibria (henceforth pNE), and which is also simple enough to be applied to real cases. However, Divide and Permute suffers from some important drawbacks, which indeed motivate our paper. Before illustrating these limitations, we briefly comment on "simplicity" in mechanism design, which is Divide and Permute's most appealing quality.
The issue of simplicity is in mechanism design is controversial because simplicity itself is an elusive concept. However, the existing literature seems to suggests that Divide and Permute (and so our games) are, in some sense, the simplest possible ones for the problem in hand. Dutta et al (1995) make it clear that, to implement Pareto efficient allocations, in equilibrium the mechanism must reveal the marginal rates of substitutions among goods. Thus, we cannot hope to solve our problem without players announcing prices, or something de facto equivalent. On the other hand, Saijo et al.(1996) suggest four properties as a definition of natural (i.e. simple) mechanisms: finite dimension (of strategy spaces), feasibility (for any strategy profile, outcomes respect a budget balance), best response (each player has a best reply against any strat-1 A famous mechanism, due to Brams and Taylor (1995) , is for EF only. egy profile) and forthrightedness (in equilibrium each players receives what she announced for herself). The canonic Maskin's mechanism for example, violates the first conditions, requiring players to announce preference profiles. On the contrary, our mechanisms possess the first three properties and essentially the forth one. Apart from Divide and Permute, there is one other "simple" game to implement fair allocations, by Saijo et al.(1999) . We comment later on this mechanism; now we illustrate a major shortcoming of this game, limitation also present in Divide and Permute. Thomson's (1999) and Saijo et al.'s (1999) game forms are a good solution to the problem of complexity, but they suffer from the other drawback common to most implementation literature: being coordination games, these mechanisms present an equilibrium selection problem. This feature is bound to emerge whenever one sets about to implement a generically multi-valued rule. What happens is that, for example, there is one equilibrium for each fair division. These latter are many and cannot be ranked in the same way by all players, so it is not clear which one should emerge, if ever. Althugh inavoidable, this problem must be dealt with. Achieving fair divisions is about enabling people to agree, so if we posit that our players are able to coordinate, we assume the problem away rather than solving it. Moreover, the coordination problem is worsened when the outcome function is discontinuous. As already pointed out by Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) , discontinuity is highly regrettable in implementation, because little mistakes on the part of players may imply the target to be missed by much. It is not clear if the continuity problem can be solved in game forms implementing EF and P O allocations. Up to now, there are no mechanisms with this property.
In this paper, the coordination problem is overcome by a learning argument. In addition to full implementation, we require that the equilibria of a mechanism be limit points of a dynamic adjustment process. More precisely, the game form presented here has the following features a) its strategy spaces and outcome functions are simple in the sense of Saijo et al. (1996) ; b) it fully implements the fair division rule in pure strategy Nash equilibria; c) for a version of perturbed best reply similar to that in Cabrales (1999) , its outcome converge with probability one to an ε-equilibrium. In turn, the set of ε-equilibria is a neighborood of the set of fair divisions; thus the limit outcomes of our game are ε-fair, in a sense to be made precise later on. In a word:
we have implementation of fairness in Nash equilibrium, and dynamic implementation of ε-fairness in ε-equilibrium. It will finally be noted that those mixed-strategy equilibria which produce non-fair divisions are weeded out by the dynamics.
Recent works (Cabrales 1999 
Notation and general setting
We have an endowment of l homogeneous divisible goods, to be divided among N individuals. No restriction is imposed on N but finiteness. The endowment is represented by a vector ω ∈ R l + . Players have strictly monotonic, continuous, convex preferences over own bundles of goods, i. e. over vectors z ∈ R l + . Individual preferences are occasionally described with the symbols º i , with º representing a profile of preferences. The set of all ºs satisfying strict monotonicity, continuity, convexity is indicated with R. We define Z as the set of partitions of ω among the N players:
Given a preference profile º∈ R, the set of efficient divisions is defined as:
Instead, envy-free divisions are allocations whereby no player prefers somebody else's share to his own:
Finally, the set of fair divisions is
The correspondence F : R → Z is the "fair division rule". It is well known thatF (º) is non-empty for any º in R. 3 It is also easy to show by means of continuity arguments, that F is generically a proper (non-single valued)
correspondence.
We now cast the fair division problem in the framework of implementation theory. A game form for our problem is a couple Γ = hS, hi such that: S = ×S i is some product strategy space, and g is an outcome function g : S → Z.
Preferences over bundles naturally define preferences over partitions, for which we use the symbol º again to simplify notation: for x, y ∈ Z we have x º i y when x i º i y i . Preferences over bundles thus define preferences over divisions and hence over outcomes of Γ. Given a preference profile, game form Γ then becomes a properly defined game Γ 0 = hS, h, ºi. Consider now the set of pure Nash equilibria of Γ 0 , which we indicate with pNE(º) (or simply pNE), and the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes g [pNE(º)]. Game form
One caveat: the sets EF , P O, F are dependent on the preference profile, and so is the set pNE for a given a mechanism. For correctness, explicit 3 Perhaps Varian (1974) noticed this first. For example, a competitive equilibrium where all player's bundles have the same value is a fair allocation.
reference to the preference profile should be maintained. However, all proofs in this paper will evidently go through whatever the chosen º∈ R. This is different from saying that the statements are themselves evident, but it spares us pedantic references to º every time we talk about equilibria. Thus for example, when we have the term "pNE" in a statement, this actually stands for "pNE(º)" and the statement will be valid for all º∈ R -which is the kind of result we need for implementation.
Our problem is twofold. First of all, we want to fully implement the correspondence F in Nash equilibria by some mechanism Γ. Then, we want the set of equilibria to be an attractor for some dynamics, to be described later on.
Viable fair division games
This section presents three game forms implementing respectively envy-free, ef- 
Envy freeness: Γ

EF
The first game implements EF divisions. Like all other games in this paper, it is a one-shot game. We first describe it informally as if it were a sequential game, to clarify its logic.
Each of the N players suggests an allocation and one of these proposals, say z, is selected (we see in a moment how). Then, the mechanism enables each player to choose his favourite share in z, whatever others' strategies. Thus, in equilibrium it will be the case that all players receive their favourite shares in z. More in detail, how is z selected? Beside suggesting an allocation, each player i names an integer and another player k i 6 = i. The integers are fed fed into a modulo game, and thus select one player (the "winner", w). Then, the "reference division" z is the one suggested by the player indicated by winner:
On the other hand, how can players choose any share in z k w ? Every i announces a permutation of the shares (π i ); these permutations are then applied to z k w in any predetermined order, before the resulting allocation is finally given out. It is clear that by playing an opportune π i , every i can to reshuffle the shares in his favour, obtaining his preferred share in z k w .
Note that the winner's choice of z is limited by the fact that k w 6 = w.
Similarly, we must also restrain the choice of k w in selecting the reference allocation z. 4 We do so imposing a punishment on the loosers (so on k w as well) in case z k w 6 = z w . By so doing, it will turn out that in equilibrium each player can pick any share in any of the proposals
.N , which in turn ensures envy-freeness (actually even more).
With a slight abuse of notation, let us write N = {1, 2, ..N } and define Π the set of permutations N → N. A formal description of the game follows.
Game form Γ P O is hS, hi :
h : S → Z is defined for the winner and the loosers as:
(the winner)
The idea of eliminating envy via permutations is borrowed from "Divide and Permute" (Thomson (2005)). There however, only two players suggest divisions, while all others play permutations. In our games, N proposals instead of two may seem somewhat redundant. However, equal strategy spaces seem more appropriate for an (ex ante) equal treatment of players. As a more substantial innovation, we introduce a modulo game which awards the winner immunity to punishments. This is substantial as it yields better dynamic properties: it can easily be seen that the best reply dynamics (is likely to) produces cycles in Divide and Permute, while in our mechanism it yields convergence.
More details are in Section 4.
We have the following Lemma 1 Game form Γ EF fully implements the EF correspondence in pure Nash equilibria, that is:
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ EF , suppose s ∈ pNE, h (s) = z. It must then be the case that z k w = z w . For if it were otherwise, any j 6 = w could conveniently deviate by playing a) n j :
gives him a non-zero share (which exists in z j+1 because the z i s are partitions of ω). As a consequence, the range of shares that each player can reach by
is the utility that i receives from share s, in equilibrium it must be h i = arg max
To prove EF ⇒ pNE suppose z ∈ EF . The strategy profile s * : s i = (z, id, 1, 1), with id the identity permutation, gives division z. Profile s * is also a pNE: in fact: i) facing s * −i , the range of shares attainable by i is {z 1 ...z N };
ii) because z ∈ EF , profile s * allocates to each player his preferred shared in this range. That is, s * is a profile of mutual best replies.
Pareto optimality: Γ P O
We now present a game that implements P O + allocations, that is Pareto optimal allocations where nobody receives a zero share. P O + allocations are clearly a superset of fair allocations, and some of them may generate envy.
We don't worry about these latter, though, as they will be ruled out by Γ EF , so we are not interested in their implementation. Again, we first describe the mechanism informally, giving it a flavour of a sequential game to illustrate its logic.
The key to optimality is that every Nash outcome will be a competitive equilibrium for some appropriate price vector. Welfare-theorem arguments To formally describe the game we need more notation. Define D as the set of allocation-price proposals whereby every i gets a non-zero bundle:
For a given proposal d = (z, p), the budget set of player i is:
We can now describe the mechanism:
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ P O + we show that, in equilibrium, each i is getting his favourite share within his budget balance B i (and these B i s are defined by a unique allocation and price vector). First observe that in equilibrium there is no i : h i = 0 (any i can win the modulo game in order to pick a particular d k and any share
As a consequence, the range of allocations over which any i is maximizing in equilibrium is
Because at least two players are making the
∀i is a competitive equilibrium with prices p k w and initial endowments z To prove z ∈ P O + ⇒ ∃s ∈ pNE : h(s) = z, suppose z ∈ P O + . By the second welfare theorem, there is a price vector p that supports z as a competitive equilibrium. The strategy profile s * : s i = (z, p, 1) ∀i yields z and is a pNE. To see this latter fact, note that the range of allocations reachable for i is {0} ∪ B i (z, p); because z * is assumed to be a competitive equilibrium, every person optimizes within his budget, i.e. s * is a profile of reciprocal best replies.
Note the role of the punishments on the loosers. We cannot allow the winner to name himself as proposer of d -otherwise any i would try to be winner so there would be no equilibrium. Thus, we assign to i a range of A few remarks put Γ P O in relation with Thomson (2005) . The idea of reaching efficiency via a competitive equilibrium is borrowed from there. However, like for Γ EF , we have a game with equal strategy spaces to ensure an (ex-ante) equal treatment of players. Other radical changes are introduced to obtain better dynamic properties (it is easy to show that Thomson's efficiency game is likely to cycle for the best reply dynamics).
Fairness: Γ F
The following mechanism combines elements of Γ EF and Γ P O to fully implements fair divisions. As in the previous games, a fair allocation emerges as a proposal made by (at least) two players. More in detail, each player: i) names a proposal d i and a reservation share z i , ii) names an integer n ∈ N, , iii)
indicates another proposal k i , iv) chooses a permutation π i . The winner of the modulo selects one proposal, to be taken as reference allocation (proposal
Then, the outcome function allows any player to pick any bundle within
or, if he prefers, any share appearing in z k w . 6 As in Γ P O , we force
w in equilibrium by punishing the loosers if this is not the case. As a result, players maximize within a family of budget balances defined by a unique price vector, so the reference allocation z k w is efficient. Permutations then ensure that each player can reach any share in z k w , thus ensuring envy-freeness.
A formal description follows.
Game form Γ F is hS, hi :
Recalling Lemma 1) and Lemma 2), the following is simply shown:
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ F , observe first that in a pNE it must be d 
h i is a competitive equilibrium allocation with prices/endowments
i.e. is efficient. Also, thanks to the permutations,
.N for each i, i.e. it's envy-free. As for the reverse inplication, consider a particular z ∈ F . Being z ∈ P O + , there is a positive price vector p that sustain it as a competitive equilibrium.
Then, it is immediate that strategies s i = (z, p, z i , 1, 1, id) are a pNE producing outcome z.
We now turn to the simplicity properties by Saijo et al (1996) 
Dynamic implementation
As argued in the Introduction, bare implementation is somewhat unsatisfactory for our problem: given the (necessary) multiplicity of equilibria of a mechanism, it is not clear if/how any of them can be coordinated upon. This is not a problem for game form Γ F though, because its equilibria can be "learned".
More precisely: a perturbed version of the best reply dynamics converges to the set of ε-equilibria with probability one. In turn, ε-equilibrium outcomes are "ε-fair" in a sense to be clarified soon. The necessity to consider ε-equilibria (and ε-fair outcomes) will become apparent in due course.
Given ε > 0 and strategy profile b s the set of ε-best replies of player i is:
Accordingly, we define BR 0 (.) = BR (.) the set of pure best replies. 7 With 7 The fact we consider pure strategies only is not a limitation, as we show later on.
this notation, the set of ε-equilibria is
As anticipated, we will obtain convergence to ε-equilibria. What are then the fairness properties of the corresponding outcomes? We have the following Lemma 3 ε-equilibrium outcomes of Γ F belong to the following set F ε of "ε-fair" allocations:
Observe that F ε can rightly be said the set of "ε-fair" allocations because there: i) no gain is possible for everyone, that exceeds ε; ii) no individual is more than ε-envious. Also, Also, the set F ε evidently shrinks to F as ε → 0. Reminding the proof of Proposition 1, establishing the above Lemma is immediate:
On the other hand, suppose
Because each i can obtain any share in B i (z, p), it is pz 0 i > pz i ∀i. Summing over i we get pω = pz 0 > pz = pω.
We introduce a last assumption; we comment it along the dynamics: A1) the set of possible proposals D = {.., d, ..} is finite and at least one of features a z ∈ F ε .
Dynamics' specification
We call s(t) = ¡ s 1 (t) , s 2 (t) .., s N (t) ¢ the strategy profile played at time t. To save notation, we use BR (s
when there is no doubt about index i. Consider then the following discretetime adjustment process: D1) At each t, with probability p i ∈ (0, 1) player i updates his strategy;
ii) otherwise, any s i ∈ BR (t − 1) is played with prob.> 0.
In words: at each time t, a random draw with probability p i decides whether player i can update his strategy (the only constraint imposed on p i is that it be uniformly bounded in time within (0, 1)). When the random draw gives to i the possibility to update at t, player i chooses any best reply to the observed action profile s −i (t − 1); however, he does not change his strategy if this turns out to be already an ε-best reply. Note that under A1) the set BR i (.) is finite (because finite is S i ), thus D2 ii) is legitimate.
The set of rest points is
It should be clear that the set of rest points coincides with that of ε-Nash equilibria: RP = NE ε . We will prove that RP is also an attractor.
We now comment on D2) and A1). An equilibrium is reached when an equilibrium allocation (within an appropriate proposal d) is suggested. In turn, by implementation only fair allocations can appear in equilibrium. Now, because new proposals are put forward randomly (by D2 ii), if players update strategies whenever they have an improving deviation (instead of an at least ε-improving one), an equilibrium would never emerge: the set F has a zero measure in Z so fair proposals are too "rare" to be hit by our players. We have two ways out: either we ensure some form of monotonicity (which amounts to new assumptions on the adustment process), or we give the target equilibrium set some mass. We choose the second way, and we do this considering F ε , the set of ε-Nash outcomes. As we discussed above, it is appropriate to label F ε the set of ε-Nash outcomes, because these latter are "ε-fair". The reason to introduce A1) is essentially the same motivating D2). In equilibrium we need w and k w to make the same proposal d. Thus, if ds were drawn from an infinite pool, no particular d could be agreed upon. The finiteness assumption could be disposed of if players had some preference for agreeing. To keep the assumptions on dynamics simple and general we prefer to introduce A1)
-which seems quite reasonable anyway. Finally, note that A1) does not make D2) redundant. Infact, if we insisted on fairness (instead of ε-fairness) we would run into the problem that there exist no finite set of allocations that includes a fair one whatever the preference profile, while this is what is needed for implementation.
Finally, we put D1) and D2) in relation with the literature. D1) allows any number of players to update at t; a different assumption appears for example in Kim and Sobel (1995) , where updating is sequential (assumption I). As it will be clear from the proof of Proposition 2, we only require that sequential updating be possible. As for D2), it does not rules out the adoption of nonbest replies. Similar formulations appear in Cabrales (1999) , who allows for less-than-ε-improving updatings, but assumes that a non-improving strategy is never adopted (assumption Y3). It can be noted that there too it was necessary to consider ε-equilibria to obtain sure convergence.
Convergence to fair divisions
The focus of this work is on fair divisions. Although similar claims can be proven for game forms Γ EF and Γ P O , we only give the main result about Γ F .
Proposition 2 Under A1, D1 and D2, mechanism Γ F is such that
In words: whatever the starting point, sooner or later the process stops.
Also, because RP = NE ε the limit allocation are in the set of "ε-fair" divisions.
The intuition behind convergence is simple. For any s −i and any division z, there is a best reply whereby z is suggested (the winner's payoff is not affected by his own d). Thus, if the updating process goes on for a sufficiently long time, an ε-fair division (perhaps up to permutations) will eventually be suggested.
At this point, provided that some conditions hold on current proposals, no player will gain from upsetting z as reference division. Instead, it will be sufficient that permutations are adjusted until the shares are allocated without envy. The resulting strategies will be an ε-equilibrium, so a rest point. The following proof puts this in formal terms.
Proof. of Proposition 2
The winner's payoff does not depend on his own d. On the other hand, the winner's range of attainable shares is the largest. Thus, it is always a best reply to win the modulo game and make a new proposal d. As a consequence, any profile of proposals {d i } i=1..N in D N will emerge before some time t, with probability tending to 1 as t → ∞. In particular, a profile d * will be put forward containing a z * such that
By assumption A1, proposals under i)-ii) do exist in D N : any {(z, p) , (z, p) , .., (z, p)}, with z ∈ F ε and p an appropriate supporting price vector satisfies i)-iii) independently of the played strategies. 
On the other hand, ii) says that if division z r 6 = z * is more attractive for i than z * (because it contains a certain share z r j ), then z r cannot become a reference division, because no one named player r (if player k had named player r, i could make k win to have z r adopted as reference allocation).
Once d * is put forward, it is sufficient that the next updater chooses ensure that the resulting strategy profile is a ε-Nash equilibrium (infact, no player, has a convenient deviation, because z * i is the best share for each i, in the range of attainable shares). As a consequence the given strategy profile is a rest point.
Remark 1 (Mixed Strategies) Our games yield full implementation in purestrategy equilibria. However, implementation fails when mixed strategy equilibria are used. This is a fact known to happen in many classic implementation mechanisms. Consider for example Γ EF and the case of two players. The strategy profile where each player: i) assigns everything to one share, ii) randomly choose between the swap and the id permutation with probability 1 2 , is clearly a NE. However, its outcome is non-EF with probability . If we look at the dynamics though, we still find that the limit outcomes are fair. The reason is simple. Proposition 2) shows that a rest point does emerge; then, because players best respond to observed strategies (not to mixtures), if σ = ¡ σ 1 , ..., σ N ¢ ∈ RP then each σ i must be a best reply against each action profile in the support of σ itself. It follows that any realized outcome from a rest point is an equilibrium outcome, which is fair by implementation.
Conclusions
The focus of this paper is on a classic fair division problem: allocating homogeneous divisible goods among players, in a way that is both envy-free and efficient. While the existence of these divisions is a well established fact, the implementation side of the problem has been less thoroughly studied.
This paper gives a procedure with the following properties: a) the procedure is a formally defined game form; we look at its Nash equilibria; b) strategy partly appear in Thomson (2005) , to which this paper is inspired. Feature c)
is new and, I suggest, important for a mechanism to be meaningful solution to an applied implementation problem, especially in the presence of multiple equilibria.
The mechanisms presented here are tailored to a specific kind of dynamics.
Although some rationality is embodied in the concept of Nash equilibrium, the considered dynamics are definitely myopic. Thus, one might doubt that players choose at t best replies to t − 1 observed actions. For example, if the shares are given out only when a rest point is reached, why should we exclude that a Nash equilibrium is deviated from? Even if a deviation from a NE is not immediately convenient, it might trigger further deviations by other players, so the final result might be a net gain for the first deviator. Similarly, one might be interested in looking at coalitional equilibrium concepts. These considerations evidently lead away from the Nash equilibrium concept.
In keeping with the classic implementation theory, this paper concentrates on Nash equilibria, and in particular on pure-strategy equilibria. However, mixed strategy equilibria as well are taken care of. In particular, mixed strategies with (random) non-fair outcomes cannot be rest point; this result descends directly from the assumptions on dynamics. If we do not accept such specification of dynamics, mixed strategy could become relevant again either when i) players observe mixed strategies -which would not be very realistic either, or when ii) players form complex beliefs about their opponents' strategies. In the latter case, we should again abandon Nash implementation, and look at appropriately defined sequential equilibria.
